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LÉON WALRAS ON INDUSTRIAL REGULATION: RAILROADS AS ECONOMIC AND 
MORAL STATE MONOPOLIES 
Andrés Alvarez* 




Modern microeconomics foundations of industrial regulation policies were developed 
during the second half of the 19th century. One of the main theoretical and applied 
debates which is still an issue today concerns natural monopolies. Railroads were at the 
center of these debates, because of their technological and industrial significance. The 
main question raised at this time was the participation of the State on the provision and 
regulation of this industry. 
 
In France, between the 1840s and 1880s the evolution of regulatory legislation was 
deeply related with the academic contributions, in particular coming from liberal 
economists belonging to the Société d’Économie Politique. The dominant views among 
these French economists advocated for a Private provision and incentives to create 
competition within this industry and some defenses of a private-public partnership 
through concessions.  Contrary to this point of view L. Walras was in favor of a purely 
public provision of railroads and transportation.  
 
Walras’s point of view was developed with twofold argument of theoretical and a moral 
nature. This paper analyses the logic and coherence of these arguments and concludes 
that they are constructed upon an original vision on human nature and economic 
dynamics that contrast with the traditional views on Walras’s pure political economy. 
The case made in favor of the State intervention on Railroads industry considers 
altruistic motivations of human action, public servants surrounded by democratic 
institutions as free press and the role of education. On the economic side we found an 
interesting dynamic argument based on the importance of the network nature of 
railroads, the possibility for the State to improve the general economic development 
through the impetus given to railroads and the possibility to take advantage of the 
monopoly rents of some railways in order to finance new parts of the network. These 
ideas are mainly establish trough a dynamic conception of the development of the 
railroads network and its consequences on economic growth. 
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Léon Walras’s applied economics has been traditionally considered 
as a derived product of his pure economics. It follows that his applied 
economic analysis is almost as abstract as his theoretical framework. Both 
works are often also considered to be naïf, far from empirical reality and 
even misleading regarding the historical facts of his time1. In particular, 
Walras’s reform propositions are considered impossible to be implemented 
or at best incoherent regarding modern political-economy approaches. 
Even historians of economic thought who vindicate Walras’s applied and 
social economics recognize the lack of clarity and his fuzzy definition of 
central concepts as “public goods”, “natural monopolies” and “moral 
monopolies”2.  
 
Modern microeconomics foundations of industrial regulation policies 
were developed during the second half of the 19th century. One of the main 
theoretical and applied debates, still open today, concerns the theoretical 
definition and regulation of natural monopolies. Railroads were at the 
center of these debates because of their technological and industrial 
relevance. The main question raised at this time was the participation of 
the State in the provision and regulation of this industry. 
 
In France, between the 1840s and 1880s the evolution of regulatory 
legislation was deeply related with academic contributions, in particular 
coming from liberal economists belonging to the Société d’Économie 
Politique. The dominant views among these French economists advocated 
for a private provision and incentives to create competition within this 
industry and some defenses of a private-public partnership through 
concessions. Walras’s views on railroads regulation are deeply influenced 
by these ideas and the debates around this influent group of thinkers. 
However, contrary to their point of view Walras was in favor of a purely 





                                                 
1
 See for example Béraud’s characterization of the common views on Walras’s theory of state intervention 
« L’analyse que Walras fait des rapports entre l’initiative privée et l’intervention de l’État occupe dans l’histoire de la 
pensée économique une place singulière. Elle a été mal reçue, sans doute en raison de ses faiblesses, mais aussi parce 
qu’elle avait été mal comprise. Les grands projets auxquels elle conduisait (…) sont apparus comme des utopies qui, 
loin de provoquer l’enthousiasme, n’ont suscité qu’une attention polie ou, pire, moqueuse. » (2004, p. 25) 
2
 For instance: Potier (1998, p. 391) finds Walras’s theory of natural monopoly less clear than his 
contemporaries’, as does Richard T. Ely. 








Walras’s opinion was developed through a twofold argument of 
theoretical and moral nature. This paper analyses the logic and coherence 
of these arguments and concludes that they are constructed upon an 
original vision of human nature and economic dynamics that contrast with 
the traditional views on Walras’s pure political economy. This novel 
theoretical conception, for the time, was built upon common views shared 
with liberal and socialist thinkers. Widespread empirical evidence and 
opinions support Walras’s diagnostic on the French railroads system. High 
prices, stagnation and inefficiency were a typical depiction of it.  
 
The case made in favor of State intervention in this industry 
considers altruistic motivations of human action, public servants 
surrounded by democratic institutions as the free press and the role of 
education. On the economic side we find an interesting dynamic argument 
based on the importance of the network nature of railroads, the possibility 
for the State to improve the general economic development through the 
impetus given to railroads and the possibility to take advantage of the 
monopoly rents of some railways in order to finance new parts of the 
network. These ideas are mainly established trough a dynamic conception 
of the development of the railroads network and its consequences on 
economic growth.  
 
The central goal of this paper is thus opening a discussion on 
Walras’s theory of railroads regulation as a construction within a larger 
political and intellectual debate during the second half of the nineteenth 
century in France, rather than coming back on the whether or not he 
developed a complete an coherent theory of natural monopoly3. I aim at 
proposing a more contextual reconstruction of Walras’s arguments, 
showing how pragmatic arguments of his time were incorporated in his 
more complex and apparently pure theoretical scheme. Nonetheless, I also 
try to come back from contextual evidence to reconstruct the rationale of 
Walras’s arguments that have often been presented as confusing or illogic 
                                                 
3
 A rich and accurate discussion on Walras’s contribution to the theory of Natural Monopoly is presented by 
M. Mosca (Mosca, 2008). She presents a view on Walras’s theory enriched with technical arguments that 
differentiate his contribution from his contemporaries’. In particular, Mosca underlines an argument rather 
unnoticed before in the literature: Walras’s theory of the Natural Monopoly is built upon a characterization 
of the technological specific characteristics of railroads distinguishing it from other forms of transportation. 
For a different point of view on these aspects, and a more critic evaluation of Walras’s contribution on the 
theory of Natural Monopolies see Ekelund & Hébert (2003). Numa (2011) proposes a different point of 
view on the Walras’s and Dupuit’s theories of Natural Monopoly, mainly based on a conceptual discussion 
on the very definition of the concept built upon the analysis of their alternative views on the regulation of 
railroads. 
LÉON WALRAS ON INDUSTRIAL REGULATION: RAILROADS AS ECONOMIC AND 









reasoning. I argue that those rationales are less theoretical and more 
pragmatic than the common views on his contribution acknowledge. 
 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: in the second section I 
present the intellectual and political context explaining the sources of 
Walras’s own ideas within a larger debate. The third section discusses the 
central concept of moral monopoly and the pricing and regulatory scheme 
Walras proposed. Finally a third section contains final remarks on 
epistemological considerations of the rupture between Walras, the French 
liberal economists and modern views on human action.  
An economic and moral debate: an economic and moral answer 
 
During the second half of the nineteenth century France witnessed a 
heated debate about the regulation of its railroads system. The contribution 
of liberal economists and socialist thinkers were numerous and diverse4. 
Multiple successive reforms finally consolidated a system mostly operated 
and developed by the French State.  
 
At the end of the 1970’s the evolution of the influence of French 
liberal economists on the legislator was stopped. The pro-privatization bias 
of very prominent figures of the liberal movement was dominant among 
intellectual opinions by the 1840s and 1850s. The French state played 
initially a role of promotion and regulation of the system. Around the 1870s 
a gradual direct intervention of the State was perceived as a necessity in 
order to complete the enlargement of the network and to rescue private 
enterprises. The pinnacle of the nationalization process was the Frecynet 
Plan in 1879 that allowed the State to extend not only its incentives for the 
development of the network (credits, taxes reductions, etc…) but to go 
further in a de facto public ownership of the whole system. This was viewed 








                                                 
4
 For a detailed historical and intellectual background on these debates see (Numa, The Infrastructure-
Superstructure distinction in railroad industry and the regulation of natural monopolies, 2009, pp. 3-5) and 
(Ekelund & Hébert, 2003, pp. 659-662).  









1.2. The intellectual pitch : the Société d’Économie Politique and 
the Journal des Économistes.  
 
The majority of these French liberal economists were related to the 
Société d’Économie Politique and Le Journal des Économistes. The society 
and the journal had also an important influence on French policy makers 
during those decades. Jaffé and other walrasian scholars5 have shown Léon 
Walras, during his young years before becoming a theoretical economist, 
collaborated with the Journal and participated in the activities of the 
Société.  
 
Within this intellectual arena Walras appears to be not only closer to 
the socialists or, at least non-liberals, from a doctrinal stand but mostly in a 
place apart from his contemporaries regarding his theoretical position. The 
originality of his analysis makes no doubt. Nevertheless, the building 
blocks of his analytical construction, what he claims to be a novel scientific 
point of view, are to be found in the opinions of politicians or practical 
men. Furthermore, what appears today as Walras’s more intricate (or even 
strange) arguments are taken from very “pragmatic” positions, common to 
these debates. Most of his arguments are a transfiguration of the 
économistes’ description of the French railroad system even though it was 
usually presented against prominent socialist figures as Proudhon6. 
 
However, as we will try to show in what follows, Walras’s theory of 
natural monopolies is not a pure theoretical construction contrasting with a 
“practical” analysis of the liberals or other outstanding economists as 
Dupuit. Though, this is not the point of view of some historians of 
economic thought as Ekelund & Hébert: 
 
                                                 
5
 In his essay on L. Walras, J. A. Schumpeter underlines the influence of the Journal des Économistes and 
the French liberal economists on Walras and in general on French academia, political and economic life in 
XIXth century France (Schumpeter, 1997). One very complete essay on the young intellectual life of L. 
Walras and his relationship with this group of liberal economists is presented in (Jaffé, 1984). More 
recently Jolink (Jolink, 1996), Cirillo (Cirillo, 1992) and de Paula (de Paula, 2002) have pointed out the 
importance of Walras’s early writings; in particular those published in the Journal des Économistes for a 
correct understanding of his whole intellectual project.  
6
 It is worth noticing the contrast between Walras’s position and Proudhon’s analysis of the railroad system. 
In an essay published as a special issue of the Journal des économistes in 1845 (Proudhon, 1845) he 
presents a very critic view on the importance of the railroads compared with fluvial transportation. His main 
argument is the relationship between railroads and the bourgeois industry in contrast with a more “popular” 
use of fluvial navigation. Walras was always in favor of the development of the railroad system because of 
its technological superiority. 
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 “… the liberals viewed nationalization (or its alternative, private 
ownership) as a matter of practice, whereas Walras viewed it as a 
matter of theory. For Walras, the core question of applied political 
economy, namely the organization of production, is a theoretical 
one.” (Ekelund & Hébert, 2003, p. 661) 
 
Walras made the case for a complete nationalization and centralization of 
the whole network. He developed two central arguments justifying his 
position. The first one concerned the characterization of railroads as 
natural and moral monopolies. From what follows a normative argument of 
justice in favor of a public rather than a private ownership and exploitation 
of the industry. The second one, and mostly unnoticed in walrasian 
scholarship, is a pragmatic economic point of view. Put in a nutshell, it was 
a development plan for the expansion of this fundamental infrastructure 
industry, based on a price system with cross-subsidies. Walras also 
supported this proposal on an argument based on the lack of private 
incentives calling for a public logic instead of pure self-interest. 
 
In his Élements d’Économie Politique Pure, Walras (1988) includes as his 
last chapter (41th lesson), some considerations on Monopoly. Given the 
strict separation between Pure and Applied economics for Walras, this 
chapter may be considered as an intruder. In fact, we find the same subject 
as part of his Études d’Économie Politique Appliquée (Walras 1992). 
However, the main difference between those expositions on Monopoly lies 
in the fact that in the “pure economics” book, Walras develops what we 
could name a “pure theory” of Monopoly. This theory, as Walras himself 
recognized, is Cournot’s theory with a little contribution of Dupuit’s 
analysis. We can thus argue that Walras’s pure theoretical conception of 
Monopoly is a direct legacy of Cournot’s; as confirmed by Walras himself, 
he was influenced by Cournot. But this influence is only recognized on two 
matters: 1) Cournot’s methodological position as a champion of the 
mathematical economics school; 2) the pure theory of monopoly as 
presented in Cournot’s first book.  
 
However, two warnings must be made. First, Walras remarks at the very 
beginning of his 41st lesson on Monopoly (in his Elements of pure 
economics) that one main assumption of his entire book has to be 
abandoned: “celle de la libre concurrence absolue en matière d’échange, de 
production et de capitalization. Ainsi, ce que nous connaissons, ce sont les 
effets de la libre concurrence. Mais quoi qu’en disent, ou qu’en paraissent 







dire, assez souvent les économistes, la libre concurrence n’est pas le seul 
mode possible d’organisation de l’industrie…” (Walras, 1988, p. 655). 
In fact, following his methodological conception, Walras seems to talk 
about Monopoly as an “imperfection” of the market; as a “perturbation” of 
the perfect competition situation. This methodological conception, which 
has been inherited by the neo-walrasian Arrow-Debreu model, implies that 
a more realistic case must be understood and judged as a perturbation of a 
more general, but purely theoretical, situation: the perfect competitive 
general equilibrium. However, the reader of the 41st lesson is disappointed.  
Walras’s exposition of the Monopoly theory is developed within a partial 
equilibrium framework. This is obvious because it is a direct legacy of 
Cournot’s Recherches chapter V (Cournot, 2001 [1838]). However, the 
epistemological status of this pure theory of Monopoly is reversed in 
Walras’s work. For Walras, this is an applied question, related thus to 
normative issues. 
 
Since his early economic and political writings, L. Walras tried to establish 
a rigorous difference between scientific (or economic) and moral 
categories. This was a central issue within his whole intellectual system, 
inherited from his father Auguste. This was a primal condition when 
establishing a clear and rigorous criterion on public policy. 
1.3. The normative judgment on Monopoly as matter of 
justice 
 
After having presented Cournot’s theory of Monopoly in his “Pure 
Economics” book, Walras goes into an important policy issue: the question 
about the railroads management. Walras’s posture on these matters is quite 
surprising: He advocates in favor of the necessity for the State to provide 
this service and against its privatization.  
 
The main argument to justify this view on Monopoly is related with a 
fundamental building block of Walras’s whole intellectual program: namely 
his conception of justice. Following this conception, the general 
competitive equilibrium situation is a normative benchmark because of its 
normative properties. Without going further on these questions (see Jaffé 
1977), we can use a quotation from the mentioned chapter on Monopoly in 
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“Qu’il n’y ait, pour les services et pour les produits, qu’un seul prix 
sur le marché, celui auquel a lieu l’égalité de l’offre et de la demande, 
et que le prix de vente des produits soit égal à leur prix de revient en 
services, ces deux conditions n’en Font qu’une seule et unique quie 
est que les services s’échangent les un contre les autres suivant des 
proportions comunes résultant des dispostions de tous leurs 
propiétaires; et cette condition est une condition de justice …” 
(Walras, 1992, p. 186) [my emphasis] 
 
This quotation sums up the role of competitive equilibrium as a norm of 
justice which constitutes a normative and a theoretical point of reference. A 
normative one because Walras always judges the “imperfect competition 
situations” as deviations from the “first best” situation of perfect 
competition. But also a theoretical reference, because in order to 
understand, from an analytical point of view, a particular organization of 
the market, the walrasian analysis describes it as a departure from this 
theoretical referent. It is thus also a methodology for pure economics and 
not only a normative analysis.  
 
To grasp the implication of this methodological point of view for Walras’s 
conception of Monopoly and his political position in favor of the 
intervention of the State on the railroad industry, we have to explain how 
Walras judges Monopoly as a transgression of the two main features of the 
perfect competitive situation. This will allow us to understand how Walras’s 
normative analysis on Monopoly leads him to propose a modification on 
the theoretical conception of Cournot’s pure theory.  
 
On the one hand, Monopoly is contrary to the equality between costs (i.e. 
prix de revient) and total income for the entrepreneur (i.e. prix de vente). 
The explanation of this is given by the strict application of Cournot’s pure 
theory of Monopoly: a monopolist can sell at a high price because of his 
market power. On the other hand, and here comes the theoretical 
departure from the cournotian framework, the monopolist is always 
capable of discriminating prices for each consumer. Here, Walras follows 
Dupuit’s theory against the assumption of a unique price postulated by 















“’Cette solution, dit Dupuit, repose sur ce principe général, c’est qu’il 
faut demander pour prix du service rendu non pas ce qu’il coûte à 
celui qui le rend, mais une somme ne rapport avec l’importance qu’y 
attaché celui à qui il est rendu. 
Nous ne saurions, quant à nous, accepter sans restrictions ce soi-
disant principe qui, énoncé d’une facon aussi absolue, serait 
destructive de toute justice.’” (Walras 1992: 192) 
 
Summing up, Walras has a normative position against the existence of 
private monopolies. This is supported on a theoretical conception of it that 
departs from the Cournotian pure theory following Dupuit’s theory of 
differentiation price policy of monopolists. Even if Cournot’s normative 
analysis on monopolies is built upon a general equilibrium framework, we 
showed that Walras takes the opposite way around: the theoretical 
framework within which he tackles the case of monopoly is the partial 
equilibrium analysis of a mixture of Cournot and Dupuit theories. 
We now come to the core of a normative problem. It is because the railroad 
is a natural monopoly, that it cannot be given to the private capital to 
exploit it: because of an argument of justice. Thus, it belongs to the State, 
the community as a whole, to take control of the railroads to avoid the 
injustice of private monopolists.  
 
« Autres exceptions à la règle de la libre concurrence. Une autre 
condition de la libre concurrence est que l’appreciation de l’utilité 
soit possible pour l’individu, ce qui n’est pas le cas, en général, pour 
les services publics. Donc il faut que l’État produise les services 
publics. (…) Une troisième enfin est que la multiplication indéfinie 
des entreprises soit possible, ce qui n’est pas le cas des monopoles 
naturels et nécessaires tels que les mines, carrières, eaux minérales, 
chemins de fer, etc., etc. Donc il faut que l’État organise les 
monopoles de façon à y ramener et y assurer l’égalité du prix de vente 
des produits à leur prix de revient en services telle qu’elle s’établit et 
se maintient d’elle-même dans les entreprises susceptibles de 
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In fact, a private monopolist will charge a differentiated price scheme in 
order to extract the maximum willingness to pay from consumers. The state 
could charge differential prices, some of which could be over the cost of 
production (i.e. prix de revient)7, but only in order to cover investment and 
cross-subsidies for the development of new or less profitable, but strategic, 
lines.  
 
1.4. Moral monopoly and public godos 
 
A good part of the scholars analyzing Walras’s theory of monopolies and in 
particular of railroads present his notion of “moral monopoly” as a very 
fuzzy idea or at best as a misleading argument8. In spite of this, our point of 
view is that in order to understand the radical position Walras developed, it 
is necessary to understand the notion of “moral monopolies”. Firstly, 
because it is at the center of the most original part of Walras’s analysis; the 
notion of “natural monopoly” being less original and controversial. 
Secondly, because what appears nowadays as a blurry and archaic notion of 
“public goods”, was in fact a very common view among socialist and liberal 
economists of his time.  
 
Michel Chevalier’s 1838 (for its second edition) entitled Des intérêts 
matériels de la France : travaux publics, routes, canaux, chemins de 
fer (Chevalier, 1838) and his entry “Chemins de fer” in the Dictionnaire de 
l’Économie Politique edited by Guillaume & Coquelin in 1853 (Coquelin & 
Guillaumin, 1853, pp. 337-362) were the main references for liberal 
thought on the regulation railways. The private provision, construction and 
development of the system was the ideal encouraged by Chevalier and the 
whole group of Économistes, as Walras used to call them. Nonetheless, 
those liberal thinkers shared with Walras a high opinion on the strategic 
role of the railroads system. This is an industry with a private interest for 
the firms involved, but it is also a public utility in a more literal sense than 
today’s use of the word. For instance, Chevalier summarized his pride of 





                                                 
7
 We have showed in (Alvarez, 2010) that there is an important difference between Walras and Edgeworth – 
Marshall, concerning this particular point of view. 
8
 See for example footnote number 12 in Ekelund & Hébert (2003, p. 663). 








“… maintenant que tout le monde s’appercoit que les points par 
lesquels la question des chemins de fer touche aux intérêts les plus 
vivaces de la politique, de l’administration et de la défense du 
territoire, de l’agriculture, du commerce et des manufactures sont en 




Coming back to Walras’s article on railroads, we should be less impressed 
and less challenged by his prose on the “moral” character of this industry. 
He is pleading in favor of a view on railroads not only from a private point 
of view but mainly from its public benefits. The private point of view 
meaning the private service provided by railroads on the transportation of 
commodities, businessmen and rich travelers. The public benefits being 
those “intérêts les plus vivaces” mentioned by Chevalier. Walras is more 
emphatic on this, and his point of view leads him to go further than the 
économistes, putting public or social benefits as more important than 
private interests:  
 
« Il faut, en vérité, avoir sur les yeux le double bandeau de 
l'individualisme le plus étroit et de l'utilitarisme le plus borné pour ne 
pas voir que, indépendamment de la façon donnée aux produits par 
le transport, les voies de communication ont encore un autre objet 
qui est de constituer, de resserrer l'unité nationale; que, de même 
qu'une ville sans rues se réduirait à un amas d'habitations isolées les 
unes des autres, de même un pays sans voies de communication 
redeviendrait une agglomération de districts étrangers les uns aux 
autres; que, grâce aux voies de communication, la population se 
distribue entre les campagnes et les villes; que, par leur moyen, 
quelques-unes de ces villes deviennent des centres de mouvement 
scientifique, industriel, littéraire, artistique, d'où les idées, qui ne se 
paient point toujours dans les frais de production des marchandises, 
se répandent sur le pays tout entier; qu'ainsi ces voies sont des agents 
essentiels de la civilisation et du progrès en tous sens. » (Walras, 
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1.5. The question of railroad rates and the cross-subsidies scheme 
 
The excessive level of rates fixed by the private railroad companies 
was acknowledged even by the liberal economists. During the 5th June 1880 
session of the Société d’Économie Politique, supporters and opponents9 of 
the nationalization of railroad enterprises agreed on a negative diagnostic 
concerning the French railroads system: trip prices are too high and the 
network development is poor and inefficient. However, there was a deep 
disagreement on what remedy was the best to solve this situation.  
The current interpretation regarding the notion of moral monopoly that 
Walras associates with railroads sustains this view is based on two 
elements: first, railroads are a natural monopoly and, therefore, it is 
undesirable, as regards justice, that its provision be private; and, second, 
railroads are public goods in as much as they serve indirectly, but 
importantly, the execution of public services like defense and security. 
However, this interpretation overlooks an major point: railroads contribute 
to the industrial development of the nation and it is possible that the public 
sector will provide this service better than the private sector.  
 
Contrary to what Ekelund & Hébert (2003) advance, Walras’s arguments in 
favor of the nationalization of railroads are also based on economic 
considerations regarding long term industrial policy. Even if they have an 
important normative component concerning commutative justice they 
include the possibility, associated with the development of railroads, of 
increasing industrial development. The private operation of railroads 
would not guarantee this possibility because private owners would not have 
the incentives to extend the railroad to underdeveloped zones of the 
country where most of the demand has a low capacity of payment. Also, 
private owners would not consider the natural monopoly aspects associated 
with railroads (national unity, transportation of artists, professors, etc.)10. 
The tariffs argument is interesting to understand that the solution to the 
public provision of monopolies cannot only be based on the equalization of 
marginal costs and price. The State might take advantage of the privileged 
position of these monopolies to obtain an adequate income and redistribute 
it, using monopoly rents. 
                                                 
9
 Mr. Chérot was the leader of the pro-nationalization group in that debate.  
10
 « La première consisterait à fixer les tarifs de façon que chaque ligne couvre ses frais en laissant à plus 
tard l’ouverture des lignes dont on prévoyait qu’elles ne pourraient pas couvrir leurs coûts. Le résultat serait 
d’offrir au public des transports bon marché tout en laissant le réseau se développer lentement. L’autre 
stratégie consiste à maintenir un tarif uniforme qui assurerait globalement l’équilibre des recettes et des 
coûts. Les lignes les plus fréquentées dégageraient un excédent qui permettrait de financer le déficit des 
autres lignes. Le transport serait plus coûteux mais le réseau se développerait plus rapidement. Walras était, 
bien sûr, favorable à cette seconde stratégie. » (Béraud, 2004, p. 22) 








Even if these arguments seem novel, actually Walras builds them based 
upon the debates at the Société and other public places. In particular, Mr. 
Chériot defends the same type of tariff structure and the project of 
integrating the railroad network against most of the members of the Société 
during the same debate in which Chévalier presents his radical position 
against nationalization:  
 
« Enfin, nous avons, mes amis et moi, dit M. Chérot, la conviction 
profonde que des économies considérables peuvent être réalisées 
dans l'exploitation des chemins de fer par une réorganisation 
nouvelle. La base de celle-ci serait d'appliquer, aux lignes de grands 
trafics et aux lignes à faible trafic, une exploitation spéciale à 
chacune, appropriée à la nature et à l'importance du trafic. Ces 
exploitations sont confondues à cette heure par le fait de la 
composition hétérogène et illogique des réseaux. La réforme que 
nous proposons consisterait à diviser, après le rachat, le réseau 
français en lignes principales ou de grand trafic et en lignes 
secondaires ou de faible trafic. » (Société d'Économie Politique, 1889, 
p. 99) 
 
Walras adds an important element to this idea. The integration of the 
railroads in a single national system under such a tariff structure must 
comply with a principle of economic theory formulated in his pure political 
economy: the State must try to equalize the average price to the production 
cost (prix de revient). But this principle is not necessarily applied to each 
individual. The point here is that exceptions can be made when they 
promote the general interest (as is the case with patents) because the 
benefits from the discriminating monopoly or the tariffs above the 
production cost would not go to private individuals but would be destined 
to the promotion of the general interest. In particular, they would be used 
in developing the railroad network in order to provide adequately a public 
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Public and private logic of action: a view on human behavior 
 
Walras’s highly optimistic opinion on the capacities of the transportation 
infrastructure to transform and develop an economy is not an original idea 
of his. It is neither a rhetoric concept far from a more pragmatic view of his 
contemporaries. It is a common view to consider railroads as a strategic 
industry. The difference between Walras and the économistes comes from a 
different element. While Chevalier and his friends would defend the 
capacity of the market and private incentives to fulfill those public services, 
Walras considers the private logic of action insufficient to create the 
conditions for it. The main disagreement being on the payment capacity 
and willingness to pay of the consumers of public benefits. Walras 
considers the limited payment capacity of the frontier provinces and less 
developed regions as an obstacle for the private provision of new lines or 
less profitable ones. But he also considers that the public benefits of 




Concerning this last point, Walras argues against a social choice theory 
based on a hypothetical social utility function (Walras, 1992, p. 187) 
constructed summing up individual marginal utilities (intensités d’utilités). 
The logic of public action, as far as the provision of public goods is 
concerned, is not to maximize individuals’ direct utility. Walras defines 
public goods as something above self-interested motivations. Public goods 
are those which « intéressent les hommes comme membres de la 
communauté ou de l’État procédant d’autorité à l’établissement des 
conditions sociales » (1992, p. 187).  
 
It is thus in terms of a « general interest » that Walras considers a public 
good. But this does not mean this notion is contrary, at least partially, to 
the modern characterization of a public good. The non-rivalry and non-
excludable conditions for public goods are related with the problem of 
payment enforcement of such goods. Walras arrives to a similar conclusion: 
he says that a public good has as its unique buyer and seller the State. 
Because there would be no individual incentives to supply or pay for it, 
even though “everyone must recognize” the social importance of those 
goods: 
 
« Le besoin des services ou produits d'intérêt privé est senti par les 
individus; le besoin des services ou produits d'intérêt public n'est 
senti dans toute son étendue que par la communauté ou l'État. De 







même que les individus ne sentent pas toujours judicieusement leurs 
besoins, l'État non plus ne sent pas toujours judicieusement les siens, 
si les hommes qui le représentent ont été mal choisis » (op. cit.) 
 
The last sentence of this quotation points out an interesting source of 
debate: whether the State is an efficient and honest administrator of public 
goods? Beginning with a common view on the public interest of railroads, 
Walras and the économistes depart on this matter. Walras will defend an 













Mr. Garnier, a representative liberal economist, summarizes the position of 
the économistes against the State intervention proposed by Mr. Chérot, and 
followed by Walras:  
 
« Quant à l'exploitation par l'État de ces vastes entreprises, il ne peut 
en être question l'État exploiterait forcément plus mal, plus 
chèrement et plus autoritairement que les compagnies actuelles. Le 
public, de son côté, serait exigeant sans raison et voudrait être 
transporté pour rien. Le coulage deviendrait bientôt considérable le 
fonctionnarisme se trouverait accru et les employés ne tarderaient 
pas à être des agents électoraux. L'exploitation par l'État, c'est le 
gâchis politique. » (Société d'Économie Politique, 1889, p. 117) 
 
Facing this objection, Walras answers with a clearcut argument in favor of 
a democratic system and its capability to enforce the collective logic of the 
public servants. Even if it is worth to consider these agents acting as 
following their meager private interests, institutions in a well-developed 
democratic society can afford a permanent control of their acts. 
Furthermore, thinking of human action as merely motivated by private 
interests and profit maximization is too narrow a view. Walras, contrary to 
common views about him being the paradigmatic image of the 
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“neoclassical” thinker, indentifies honor and other non-profit motivations 
as important as other motivations of human action: 
 
« Là où l’esprit politique est formé, la presse libre et sérieuse, les 
fonctions publiques sont convenablement remplies, et des magistrats 
intègres, de braves officiers, des administrateurs éclairés et d’habiles 
ingénieurs font un besogne souvent très considerable pour une 
rémuneration parfois modique. La considération et l’honneur sont, il 
faut le reconnaître, des mobiles d’activité naturels à l’homme aussi 
bien que le désir de gagner beaucoup d’argent. L’État a son rôle 
comme l’individu a le sien, et il faut avoir confiance en l’État dans la 
limite de ses attributions comme en l’individu dans la limite de 
siennes. » (Walras, 1992, p. 212) 
 
There are then more intricate arguments in-between economics and 
politics against the liberal stand. Walras defends a public provision of 
goods, even of private utility, arguing that beyond purely private individual 
interests, individuals can also act motivated by a collective interest and that 
democratic controls can contribute to keep a level of social commitment 
amongst civil servants that guarantees the adequate provision of such 
goods. This form of control cannot be used over private firms and, 
therefore, nothing could actually guarantee that they guarantee an 
adequate provision of such services and public goods.  
Concluding Remarks 
 
Exploring the case of railroads allows us to see some less noticed aspects of 
Walras’s thought. Besides his work as an economic theorist Walras shows a 
keen interest in the practical issues of his times. He approaches these issues 
using his theoretical framework which allows him to identify the 
appropriate spaces for government intervention; those where perfect 
competition doesn’t hold. The action of the State is justified not only in the 
presence of market failures but also because it is the only way to address 
justice issues, which lay beyond the scope of pure theory. 
This exploration also shows how Walras believes there is no single recipe 
for dealing with different market structures. Monopolies should be 
regulated differently depending on the goods and services they provide.  
Finally, Walras believes that problems of political economy cannot be 
reduced to compatibility of incentives or mechanism design: we must 
consider other motivations of human action and the political institutions in 
order to have a complete picture and optimal solutions.  
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